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A. Introduction
There have been a number of significant oil and gas decisions this past
year, although there were fewer decisions in the spring and summer of 2020
due to the covid-19 pandemic. In Briggs v. Southwestern Energy
Production Co., the year’s most prominent case, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that the traditional “rule of capture” applies to horizontal
unconventional oil and gas wells. In SLT Holdings, LLC v. Mitch-Well
Energy, Inc., the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that abandonment of a
leasehold negated retained acreage provisions in a lease, permitting
conversion claims against lessee for oil removed from storage tanks. In
another case, Wilson v. Snyder Bros., Inc., the Superior Court held that a
lessor’s ratification of lease waived any prior defects in lessee’s
performance under the lease. The Commonwealth Court upheld a zoning
plan that permitted oil and gas development in rural low-density residential
districts against a challenge under the Pennsylvania Constitution’s
Environmental Rights Amendment (Protect PT v. Penn Twp. Zoning
Hearing Bd.). The Commonwealth Court also rejected late fees and
penalties imposed on an oil and gas operator after the operator had
challenged (Snyder Bros., Inc. v. Com. Of Pa. Public Utilities Comm’n).
With respect to federal courts, in UGI Sunbury LLC v. A Permanent
Easement for 1.7575 Acres, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals excluded
expert testimony as to “stigma” damages in the condemnation of a gas
pipeline that did not meet the standards under the Daubert case. A district
court denied a lessor’s claims that a lessee breached the implied covenant to
develop by failing to drill additional wells once two producing wells were
drilled (Diehl v. SWN Prod. Co., LLC). In another case, the district court
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concluded that lessors raised an issue of fact whether lessees had conducted
sufficient activities to hold leases under an operations clause (Butters v.
SWN Prod. Co., LLC). In a third case, a district court held that an alleged
agency relationship between a tax sale purchaser and the surface owner
could preclude a “title wash” of unassessed oil and gas interests under the
tax parcels (Pennsylvania Game Comm'n v. Thomas E. Proctor Heirs Tr.).
In B&R Resources, LLC v. Dep’t of Envtl. Protection, the
Environmental Hearing Board held the owner and operator of an oil and gas
company personally liable under the participation theory for well plugging
costs after the company was ordered to plug the well by the Pennsylvania
Department of Environmental Protection, but only as to those costs that the
company was able to pay at the time of the order. Lastly, on the regulatory
front, the cost of an unconventional well permit was increased 150% to
$12,500 per permit.
B. Pennsylvania Supreme Court
1. Briggs v. Sw. Energy Prod. Co., 224 A.3d 334 (Pa. Jan. 22, 2020)
●

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the
Superior Court, holding that the rule of capture applied to
unconventional, hydraulically fractured natural gas wells. The
Court remanded the decision to the lower court to consider if
landowners sufficiently alleged a trespass claim based on a
physical invasion of landowners’ tract.

Plaintiff landowners, the Briggs, filed trespass and conversion claims in
the Court of Common Pleas of Susquehanna County against Southwestern
Energy Production Company (“Southwestern”), the operator of an
unconventional natural gas well on an adjacent tract, alleging that
Southwestern was extracting natural gas from under their undeveloped
parcel.1 The Briggs did not expressly allege that Southwestern had caused a
physical intrusion into their property. Southwestern filed an answer
denying that it had drilled under the Briggs’ land and pled a new matter
alleging that the Briggs’ claim was barred by the rule of capture. 2 At the
end of discovery, Southwestern filed a motion for summary judgment. The
Court of Common Pleas granted Southwestern’s motion and the Briggs
appealed.3
1. Briggs v. Sw. Energy Prod. Co., 224 A.3d 334, 339 (Pa. Jan. 22, 2020).
2. Id. at 340.
3. Id. at 340-341.
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The Superior Court reversed the decision of the Court of Common
Pleas.4 The Superior Court acknowledged that the Briggs did not allege a
physical intrusion, but inconsistently characterized the issue as whether a
trespass occurs when the defendant uses hydraulic fracturing in a manner
“which extends into an adjoining landowner’s property and results in the
withdrawal of natural gas from beneath that property[.]”5 The Superior
Court held that hydraulic fracturing may give rise to trespass liability,
particularly if subsurface fractures, fluid or proppants cross boundary lines. 6
The Superior Court reasoned that hydraulically fracturing is distinguishable
from conventional drilling because (1) it uses artificial means to stimulate
the flow of gas from shale formations; (2) the self-help remedy of drilling a
neighboring well is unfeasible for small landowners due to the cost of
unconventional wells; and (3) the rule of capture would permit an operator
to drain an adjacent tract by drilling a well near a lease boundary. 7 The
Superior Court cited the dissent in the Texas Supreme Court case Coastal
Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza8 and a vacated West Virginia federal district
court opinion in the case Stone v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC.9 However,
the record contained no evidence that Southwestern’s operations had
resulted in a subsurface intrusion. Therefore, the Superior Court remanded
the case to the court of common pleas for additional factual development.
The Supreme Court summarized the Superior Court’s analysis as follows:
“first, that whenever ‘artificial means,’ such as hydraulic fracturing, are
used to stimulate the flow of underground resources, the rule of capture
does not apply because drainage does not occur through the operation of
‘natural agencies,’ and second, that in this particular case summary
judgment was premature in light of certain unspecified allegations relating
to cross-boundary intrusions into Plaintiffs’ land.”10
On appeal Southwestern framed the following issue for review:
Does the rule of capture apply to oil and gas produced from
wells that were completed using hydraulic fracturing and
preclude trespass liability for allegedly draining oil or gas from
under nearby property, where the well is drilled solely on and
4. Briggs v. Sw. Energy Prod. Co., 184 A.3d 153 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018).
5. Briggs, 224 A.3d at 342 (quoting Briggs, 184 A.3d at 158) (emphasis in original).
6. Id. at 343.
7. Id.
8. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Tr., 268 S.W.3d 1, 42 (Tex. 2008).
9. Stone v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, No. 5:12-CV-102, 2013 WL 2097397
(N.D.W. Va. Apr. 10, 2013).
10. Briggs, 224 A.3d at 343.
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beneath the driller’s own property and the hydraulic fracturing
fluids are injected solely on or beneath the driller’s own
property?11
The Supreme Court concluded that the parties did not disagree as to this
question: they both responded in the affirmative. However, the parties
disagreed as to whether a physical intrusion took place, an issue that was
not properly before the Supreme Court.12 The Supreme Court nonetheless
decided it was proper to resolve the stated issue because the Superior Court
opinion set forth a per se ruling foreclosing application of the rule of
capture to hydraulically fractured wells.
The Supreme Court first noted that the rule of capture traditionally
applies even if the driller uses artificial methods to stimulate the flow of oil
or gas; drilling itself constitutes an artificial stimulation method. 13 There is
no reason why the rule should apply any differently to hydraulic fracturing
conducted solely on the driller’s property. The judiciary lacks institutional
tools necessary to determine their continuing feasibility regarding self-help
measures.14
Furthermore, the present record did not support the Superior Court’s
implicit assumption that drainage can only occur if there is a physical
invasion of the neighboring property. The Supreme Court noted that
drainage might occur without a physical intrusion:
We cannot rule out, for example, that a fissure created through the
injection of hydraulic fluid entirely within the developer’s property may
create a sufficient pressure gradient to induce the drainage of hydrocarbons
from the relevant stratum of rock underneath an adjacent parcel even absent
physical intrusion. Nor can we discount the possibility that a fissure created
within the developer’s property may communicate with other, pre-existing
fissures that reach across property lines. Whether these, or any other noninvasive means of drainage occasioned by hydraulic fracturing, are
physically possible in a given case is a factual question to be established
through expert evidence. 15

11. Id (emphasis in original).
12. Id. at 346.
13. Id. at 348.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 349 (citing Brief for Amicus Prof. Terry Engelder, at 18 (indicating gas located
in unconventional reservoirs exists within a network of cracks and fissures, and the gas may
move across property lines when hydraulic fracturing “tap[s] into” that network)).
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The Supreme Court held that expert evidence is required by the plaintiff
to establish whether a physical intrusion occured. 16 The Supreme Court
declined to consider Southwestern’s argument that physical trespass
concepts should be relaxed for activities that take place miles below the
surface, because that argument was beyond the scope of the issue on
appeal.17 The Supreme Court vacated the order of the Superior Court and
remanded the case to the Superior Court for reconsideration. 18
Justice Dougherty authored a concurring and dissenting opinion joined
by Justice Donahue, which dissented from the majority as to the remand to
the Superior Court and would instead remand to the trial court.19 The
opinion also disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that the plaintiffs did
not sufficiently allege a physical trespass.20
C. Pennsylvania Superior Court
1. SLT Holdings, LLC v. Mitch-Well Energy, Inc., 217 A.3d 1258
(August 13, 2019), petition for allowance of appeal granted, 229 A.3d
570
●

Lessee abandoned leases by failing to produce oil and gas and
removal and sale of oil in tanks after abandonment constituted
conversion, as abandonment nullified retained acreage language
in leases.

Plaintiff landowners, SLT Holdings, LLC, (“SLT”), owned two tracts
subject to decades-old leases that were currently held by lessee-operator,
Mitch-Well Energy, Inc. (“Mitch-Well”). SLT filed a complaint in the
Court of Common Pleas of Warren County in 2013 seeking an injunction,
declaratory judgment, an accounting, ejectment, conversion, and tortious
interference with contract.21 In 2017, plaintiff filed a motion for summary
judgment on the injunction, declaratory judgment and conversion counts

16. Id. (“Thus, to the extent this lawsuit goes forward on Plaintiffs’ new, physicalintrusion theory, Plaintiffs will bear the burden of demonstrating that such an intrusion took
place.”).
17. Id. at 350 (citing Pa.R.A.P. 1115(a)(3); Commonwealth v. Metz, 534 Pa. 341, 347
n.4, 633 A.2d 125, 127 n.4 (1993) (citing Commonwealth v. Milyak, 508 Pa. 2, 5 n.3, 493
A.2d 1346, 1348 n.3 (1985)).
18. Id. at 351.
19. Id. at 353.
20. Id. at 353-354.
21. SLT Holdings, LLC v. Mitch-Well Energy, Inc., 217 A.3d 1258, 1262 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2019).
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which was granted by the trial court. Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed its
remaining counts and Mitch-Well appealed.22
The habendum clauses in the leases provided that that the primary term
would be extended “for as long thereafter as oil or gas or other substances
covered hereby are or can be produced in paying quantities….” The leases
also contained delay rental provisions, operations clauses and shut-in
clauses. The leases contained drilling commitment provisions that required
lessee to drill multiple wells. If lessee failed to meet this requirement, the
lease would terminate except as to twenty acres around each producing well
already drilled (which was later amended to only five acres). 23 One well
was drilled on each lease in 1986 and no other well was drilled until Utica
Resources, Inc., (lessee) under a new lease, drilled a well in 2011. The
record established that no shut-in payments were tendered and no oil and
gas were produced for twenty-five years.24 The Department of
Environmental Protection records indicated the wells were deemed
abandoned as early as 1990.25
The trial court held that Mitch-Well had abandoned the leases by failing
to develop the leases as required by the implied covenant to develop. 26 The
Superior Court affirmed the trial court.27 The Superior Court also rejected
Mitch-Well’s argument that it had the right to remove the oil in the tanks
under the retained acreage provision of the leases’ drilling commitment
provisions. The Superior Court accepted the trial court’s conclusion that
because the leases were abandoned, the retained acreage language in the
leases was nullified.28
2. Wilson v. Snyder Bros., Inc., No. 734 WDA 2019, --- A.3d ---, 2020
WL 2313813 (Pa. Super. Ct. May 11, 2020)
●

Lessor’s ratification of lease and acceptance of royalty payments
waived prior defects in performance

The Superior Court held that an oil and gas lease that required the lessee
to drill a well within 180-days or pay a delay rental did not terminate for
failure to drill because the lessors expressly ratified the lease six and half
22. Id.
23. Id at 1265.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1266.
26. Id. at 1266-1267 (citing Jacobs v. CNG Transmission Corp. 332 F.Supp.2d 759
(W.D. Pa. 2004); Aye v. Philadelphia Co., 193 Pa. 451, 44 A. 555 (1899)).
27. Id. at 1267.
28. Id. at 1268.
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years later.29 Affirming the trial court, the Superior Court found that the
lessors’ ratification of the leases and acceptance of royalty payments
waived any prior defect.
Lessors, Donald Wilson, Shirley Wilson, James Wilson, Marie Wilson
and Lara S. Wilson Shields (“the Wilsons”), entered into a lease in 2003. 30
The lease provided that lessee, Snyder Brothers, Inc., had the right to drill a
well within 180-days of the date of the lease or pay a delay rental to extend
the term of the lease. Snyder Brothers paid delay rentals from 2003 to
2010.31 In 2010, Snyder Brothers obtained a permit to drill a well and also
obtained ratifications of the leases from the Wilsons and drilled a well
before the end of 2010.32 Snyder Brothers unitized the well and paid
royalties to all lessors included in the drilling unit. 33
Snyder Brothers assigned the leases to Winfield Resources, LLC
(“Winfield”). 34 Winfield then assigned an interest to PennEnergy
Resources, LLC (“PennEnergy”). 35,36 PennEnergy approached the Wilsons
in 2017 to amend and ratify the previously amended lease from 2010. 37 The
Wilsons refused, stating that they believed the lease had already
terminated.38 The Wilsons refused royalty payments since 2017.39
The Wilsons filed a complaint in 2018 challenging the validity of the
leases.40 The Wilsons alleged that the lease terminated due to the lessee’s
failure to drill within 180-days.41 Relying on the Superior Court’s decision
in Hite v. Falcon Partners,42 the Wilsons claimed that the lease could not be
extended beyond the primary term through the indefinite payment of delay
rentals.43 The Wilsons also argued that the lease terminated after Snyder
Brothers drilled due to the well being impermissibly shut-in.44
29. Wilson v. Snyder Bros., Inc., No. 734 WDA 2019, --- A.3d ---, 2020 WL 2313813
(Pa. Super. Ct. May 11, 2020).
30. Id. at *1.
31. Id.
32. Id. at *2.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Snyder Brothers, Winfield and PennEnergy, collectively, the “Lessees”.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at *3.
41. Id.
42. 13 A.3d 942 (Pa. Super. 2011).
43. Wilson, 2020 WL 2313813, at *3.
44. Id.
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Lessees filed a demurrer for failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted based on the Lessors’ delay rental argument. 45 The
Wilsons pled that they ratified the leases in 2010 and accepted royalty
payments after drilling commenced. The Wilsons then waited seven years
after ratifying the lease and after Snyder Brothers drilled on the property
before challenging the validity. 46 The trial court sustained the demurrer
concluding that the Wilsons failed to allege facts showing the original
leases terminated.47
Lessees filed a preliminary objection that the claims related to
impermissible shut-ins lacked sufficient specificity.48 The Wilsons alleged
that the leases terminated due to impermissible “shut-in” periods. The
pleading stated “[u]pon information and belief, the . . . Well has
intermittently produced gas for approximately seven (7) years and has never
continuously produced gas for any consecutive calendar year since
production began in or around June 2011.”49 The Wilsons alleged that the
breach occurred “at various times.” 50 The trial court sustained the
preliminary objection for lack of specificity and gave Lessors the
opportunity to re-plead to provide specific dates of the shut-ins. Lessors did
not take that opportunity.51 The trial court dismissed the complaint.
The Superior Court affirmed the trial court. The ratification and
acceptance of annual delay rental payments waived any potential prior
defect presented by the payment of delay rentals. 52 Hite had no effect on the
facts before the court. In Hite, the Superior Court held that delay rental
payments alone do not extend the primary term of an oil and gas lease if
drilling had not begun. 53 The Superior Court reasoned that allowing a lessee
to pay delay rental and postpone development indefinitely is “inconsistent
with the established rulings grounded in public policy.”54 Here, in contrast
to Hite, the Wilsons ratified their original leases beyond the primary term
and did not seek to void their amended leases until years after drilling had

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Hite, 13 A.3d at 948) (citations omitted).
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already begun. 55 Under settled contract law, the Wilsons waived any claim
they may have had to dispute the validity of the subject leases that accrued
prior to the 2010 ratification in their amended agreements. 56
The Superior Court also affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the
declaratory action for lack of specificity in the pleadings.57 The Wilsons did
not identify “the length of the alleged shut-ins or why they believe they
occurred; nor did they attempt to gather pre-complaint discovery as to those
missing pieces of their allegations.” 58 The Lessees were without enough
information to adequately prepare a defense to the Wilson’s breach of
contract claims.
This case demonstrates the application of general contract principles to
the relationship between lessee and lessor. Here, lessors, both expressly and
through their actions, ratified the underlying lease. As such, the lessors
waived defects in performance that might have occurred prior to the
ratification.
D. Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court
1. Protect PT v. Penn Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 220 A.3d 1174 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. Nov. 14, 2019)
●

Zoning ordinance allowing unconventional oil and gas
development in low-density residential zoning district did not
violative residents’ rights

The Commonwealth Court affirmed a trial court order denying a
constitutional challenge to a local zoning ordinance that allowed
unconventional oil and gas development in zoning districts with lowdensity residential properties. 59 Protect PT challenged the ordinance’s
constitutionality on grounds that it violated the Township residents’
substantive due process rights and the Environmental Rights Amendment
(“ERA”) in Article I, Section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 60
Relying on its recent decisions in Frederick v. Allegheny Township Zoning
Hearing Board 61 and Delaware Riverkeeper Network v. Middlesex
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at *5.
58. Id.
59. Protect PT v. Penn Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 220 A.3d 1174 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
Nov. 14, 2019).
60. Id.
61. 196 A.3d 677 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2018) (en banc).
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Township Zoning Hearing Board,62 the Commonwealth Court upheld the
trial court’s conclusion that the zoning ordinance did not violate either the
substantive due process rights of the Township's residents or their rights
under the ERA.
The Penn Township Board of Commissioners enacted a zoning
ordinance (“Ordinance”) that allowed oil and gas extraction in a zoning
district called the “Rural Resource District,” which permitted low-density
residential properties.63 The Ordinance described the purpose of the Rural
Resource District as “providing land for continuing agricultural operations,
resource management, timber harvesting, outdoor recreation, public and
private conservation areas, low density single family residential, and
compatible support uses.”64 The Ordinance established a Mineral Extraction
Overlay (“MEO”) District that permitted unconventional natural gas
development in the Rural Resource District.65 Protect PT challenged the
constitutionality of the MEO District on grounds that it permits
unconventional natural gas development in the Rural Resources District,
arguing that unconventional natural gas development is a heavy industrial
activity incompatible with residential use and the resident’s rights under the
ERA. The Zoning Hearing Board did not schedule a public hearing on the
challenge, deeming it denied under the Municipalities Planning Code. 66
The trial court held a four-day de novo trial on the challenge, ultimately
finding that Protect PT did not carry its burden of establishing the invalidity
of the Ordinance. Critical to its holding, the court noted that unconventional
drilling is a special exception, subject to numerous standards “including
general development standards in the [Ordinance] and particular standards
pertaining to MEO District.”67 Under the Ordinance, the Zoning Hearing
Board could impose additional conditions to promote the health and safety
of the Township’s residents. Furthermore, the developer is required to
“demonstrate that the drill site operations will not violate the [Township
citizens’] right to clean air and pure water as set forth in the [ERA] through

62. No. 2609 C.D. 2015, 2019 WL 2605850 (Pa. Commw. Ct. June 26, 2019).
63. Protect PT, 220 A.3d at 1177.
64. Id. at 1179.
65. Id. 1177.
66. Id. at 1178; see 53 P.S. § 10961.1(f)(1) (validity challenge deemed denied when the
zoning hearing board fails to commence hearing within time limits).
67. Protect PT, 220 A.3d at 1179.
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the submission of reports from ‘qualified environmental individuals’ stating
that the proposed drilling will not negatively impact these rights.” 68
The Commonwealth Court, relying upon the trial court’s judgment of the
credibility of the witnesses, found the trial court did not abuse its discretion
by finding unconventional oil and gas development compatible with the
purpose of the Rural Resource District. The industrial impact of a well pad
occurs during the development and construction of the well pad. That
industrial impact curtails once the wells are producing. Because any
industrial type impacts are short-lived and relate to development and
construction, the use of the land is not incompatible. 69
A second notable piece of the decision relates to the ERA. Protect PT
argued that the Ordinance and the trial court’s decision fail to protect the
Township residents’ right to a healthy environment under the ERA. 70
Protect PT argued that there is no evidence in the record that the Township
“actually identified or evaluated the environmental impacts of its decisionmaking in creating the MEO District.” 71 The Commonwealth Court
disagreed, pointing to a section of the Ordinance that specifically related to
an unconventional oil and gas developer’s obligation to meet the
requirements of the ERA. 72 That sections states in relevant part:73
The applicant shall demonstrate that the drill site operations will
not violate the citizens of Penn Township's right to clean air and
pure water as set forth in [Article I, Section 27] of the
Pennsylvania Constitution (the Environmental Rights
Amendment). The applicant shall have the burden to
demonstrate that its operations will not affect the health, safety
and welfare of the citizens of Penn Township or any other
potentially affected land owner.
The Commonwealth Court concluded that the Township considered its
residents’ rights under the ERA.
Finally, the Commonwealth Court agreed with the trial court that Protect
PT failed to carry its burden to prove its substantive validity challenge by
68. Id. (citing Ordinance § 190-641(D)).
69. Id. at 1184 (citing Frederick, 196 A.3d at 689 (zoning regulates the use of land and
not the particulars of development and construction) (emphasis original) (citations and
quotations omitted)).
70. Id. at 1196.
71. Id. at 1197.
72. Id.
73. Ordinance § 190-641(D).
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showing that the Zoning Ordinance is arbitrary and unreasonable and bears
no substantial relationship to promoting the public health, safety and
welfare. 74 The Ordinance provides “an extensive regulatory scheme far
beyond that imposed on any other use” to protect the general public. 75 The
Court determined that the Ordinance properly balances the rights of the
citizens to benefit from unconventional oil and gas development (which is
historically rooted in the community) with the interests of the general
public.76 Relying upon its recent decisions in Frederick and Delaware
Riverkeeper Network (Middlesex), the Commonwealth Court upheld the
Ordinance.
2. Snyder Bros., Inc. v. Pa. Public Utilities Comm’n., No. 1043 CD
2015, 2020 WL 587012 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Feb. 6, 2020)
●

Exploration and production company not liable for penalties and
fines assessed for non-payment of impact fees after challenging
the assessment of those fees

In an unreported panel decision, the Commonwealth Court held that
Snyder Brothers, Inc. was not liable for fees and penalties assessed by the
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (“PA PUC”) for Snyder Brothers’
failure to pay certain impact fees on natural gas production. 77
Pennsylvania’s Oil and Gas Act, commonly known as “Act 13,” requires oil
and gas producers to pay impact fees based on yearly production. 78 Snyder
Brothers challenged to the imposition of impact fees on forty-five
conventional wells producing less than 90,000 cubic feet of gas per day
during any month of the calendar year.79 Snyder Brothers argued that wells
falling below that threshold were “stripper wells” outside the scope of the
impact fee.
Snyder Brothers challenged the impact fees before the PA PUC. The PA
PUC held that Snyder Brothers had to pay fees on those wells it considered
“stripper wells.” Snyder Brothers appealed the PA PUC and won the impact
fee challenge before the Commonwealth Court. The case went up to the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which interpreted the definition of stripper
74. Protect PT, 220 A.3d at 1199.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Snyder Bros., Inc. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n., No. 1043 CD 2015, 2020 WL 587012
(Pa. Commw. Ct. Feb. 6, 2020).
78. 58 Pa. Cons. Stat. ch. 23.
79. Snyder Bros., Inc., 2020 WL 587012, at *1.
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well differently and reversed the Commonwealth Court.80 The Supreme
Court remanded all issues remaining from the PA PUC adjudication back to
the Commonwealth Court.
The Commonwealth Court, on remand, considered whether Snyder
Brothers was required to pay fines and penalties on the impact fees that it
challenged. 81 The Commonwealth Court held that Synder Brothers was not
required to pay those fines and penalties assessed during its good faith
challenge because Snyder Brothers lacked a method to challenge the
original impact fee assessment. The Court cited PA PUC’s observation
that:82
There is no mechanism in Act 13 whereby [Snyder Brothers]
could have paid under protect the amount of any impact or spud
fees that it disputed. Similarly, Act 13 contains no mechanism by
which the [PA PUC] could refund any impact or spud fees that
were paid and disbursed to a municipality, but thereafter
determined not to be due and owing or otherwise to have been
erroneously paid.
Snyder Brothers had to wait until it was under an enforcement action to
argue its case against the imposition of the fees.
The Court concluded that Act 13 lacked a meaningful hearing or
opportunity to adequately protect property interests against unreasonable
deprivation.83 Act 13 does not provide an opportunity to obtain a clear and
certain remedy in the event of a successful challenge to the imposition of
impact fees.84 There is no refund. “Under the federal constitution, and
necessarily the charter of this Commonwealth, the ability of a producer to
obtain an actual and complete remedy is indispensable to meet due process
concerns.”85 The Court continued, “[b]y employing a procedure that
deprives [Snyder Brothers] of its property without affording [Snyder
Brothers] the opportunity to meaningfully challenge that deprivation and
attain full relief, Act 13 effectuates a violation of [Snyder Brothers]’s due
process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.”86
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

See Snyder Bros., Inc. v. Pa. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 198 A.3d 1056 (Pa. 2018).
Id. at *2.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *5.
Id.
Id. at *6.
Id.
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Additionally, the Court held that PA PUC’s imposition of fees and
penalties amounted to a due process violation because Snyder Brothers did
not have adequate notice of the sanctions. 87 Snyder Brothers argued, and the
Court agreed, that PA PUC gave inconsistent advice at the outset of the
appeal regarding the possibility of any sanction. 88 Snyder Brothers claimed
it was “sanctioned for actually following the precise appeal procedures
recommended” by PA PUC.89
The Commonwealth Court began with the premise that “the requirement
of clear and adequate notice is not satisfied where the administrative agency
offers baffling and inconsistent advice, and due process prohibits a person
from being penalized for acting in conformance with prior agency
guidance.”90 The Court continued:91
Put simply, the Commission provided SBI with “baffling and
inconsistent” advice and made affirmative representations. In
essence, the Commission punished SBI when it acted in
conformity—or at least substantially complied—with the advice
and guidance that it provided to the public and entities regulated
under Act 13. . . . [B]ased on the ambiguities in Act 13, SBI,
under a reasonable person standard, could not identify with
ascertainable certainty, whether or not, or in what circumstances,
it could challenge the impact fee statements without facing the
threat of interest and a penalty.
As such, the company had no due process right to challenge the validity of
the assessment or seek a refund for the disputed amounts. Furthermore,
because Snyder Brothers did not have adequate notice of the possible
sanctions it faced for not paying the impact fees, it amounted to an
unconstitutional deprivation of due process. The Commonwealth Court held
that Snyder Brothers was not required to pay the penalties.

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at *9.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *10 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Id. at *13.
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E. Third Circuit Court of Appeals
1. UGI Sunbury LLC v. A Permanent Easement for 1.7575 Acres, 949
F.3d 825 (3d Cir. 2020)
●

Expert opinion that property value decreased due to “stigma” of
the presence of a natural gas pipeline must be adhere to the
reliability standards set forth in Daubert

A panel of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously vacated
awards of just compensation under the Natural Gas Act holding that the
district court abused its discretion by accepting an expert’s opinion that the
stigma of a natural gas pipeline decreased the value of the property under
which the pipeline crossed.92 The appeals arose from a natural gas pipeline
condemnation action commenced in the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania. UGI Sunbury, LLC (“UGI”), sought to
condemn easements for a natural gas pipeline facility. The district court
granted UGI the right to condemn the easements and then held non-jury
trials to determine the just compensation owed to the landowners. 93
Both UGI and the owners of the affected tracts of land submitted
evidence of the value of the property. The common measure of
compensation for a partial taking—such as the condemnation of an
easement—is the difference in the value of the tract burdened by the
easement before the taking and after the taking. 94 In other words, the court
will award any diminution of value to the affected tract as a result of the
pipeline. The landowners engaged Don Paul Shearer, a real estate appraiser,
to provide expert opinion testimony of the valuation of the tracts.95 Mr.
Shearer used a “damaged goods” theory to opine that the mere presence of
the pipeline negatively impacted the market value due to the stigma
associated with natural gas pipelines. 96 UGI moved in limine to exclude
Mr. Shearer’s testimony for failure to meet the standards required by
Federal Rule of Evidence 702.97 The district court relied upon Mr. Shearer’s
testimony to the decreased value due to the stigma of the pipeline and
awarded just compensation based in-part on that testimony.
92. UGI Sunbury LLC v. A Permanent Easement for 1.7575 Acres, 949 F.3d 825 (3d
Cir. 2020).
93. Id. at 829-30.
94. 26 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 702(a); see Rover Pipeline LLC v. Rover Tract No. PA-WA-HL004.500T, No. 19-1613, --- Fed.Appx. ---, 2020 WL 2214132 (3d Cir. May 7, 2020).
95. UGI Sunbury LLC, 949 F.3d at 829.
96. Id. at 830.
97. Id.
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UGI appealed to the Third Circuit, arguing that the “damaged goods”
theory and stigma damages were improper. Applying Federal Rule of
Evidence 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579
(1993), the Third Circuit held that the expert’s opinion was unreliable,
lacked “fit” and would not assist the trier of fact. 98 Mr. Shearer largely
based his opinion on anecdotes from his past employment and experience in
an appliance shop..99
Under his “damaged goods” theory, Mr. Shearer opined that property a
pipeline crosses under has a lower value because people perceive it as
damaged. Applying the factors of reliability, the panel held that the
expert’s methodology was incapable of testing, had not been peer reviewed,
was not generally accepted, and did not provide for a rate of error. Under
its precedent, an expert’s opinion does not have to meet all, or even most,
of those factors. The fact that this expert’s opinion met none, left his
opinion unreliable. 100 Notably, the expert agreed that his report contained
elements of subjectivity and speculation.101
The Third Circuit also held that the expert opinion did not “fit” and
could not assist the trier of fact. 102 The Third Circuit noted that some parts
of the expert’s opinion compared the value of properties impacted by oil
spills and radiation emitted from the Three-Mile Island nuclear disaster. 103
Those properties were distinguishable from the subject properties and
incapable of assisting the trier of fact in concluding the impact to the value
of property under which a natural gas pipeline crosses. Mr. Shearer’s
testimony simply did not fit the action.
Finally, the Third Circuit held that Rule 702 applies to bench trials in the
same way that it applies to jury trials. 104 The district court must act as
“gatekeeper” and ensure that expert opinions are based on reliable science.
The Third Circuit did provide that district courts have “leeway” to decide
how to analyze an opinion under Rule 702, such as conditionally hearing
the testimony. The opinion demonstrates, however, that even with leeway,
the district courts must analyze the reliability and fit of the proffered
expert’s testimony.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 836.
Id. at 834.
Id.
Id. at 831, 835.
Id.
Id. at 831, 836.
Id. at 832.
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F. Federal District Court
1. Diehl v. SWN Prod. Co., LLC, No. 3:19-CV-1303, 2020 WL 1663342
(M.D. Pa. Apr. 3, 2020)
●

The district court granted defendant oil and gas lessee’s motion
to dismiss lessor’s claim for breach of the implied covenant to
develop an oil and gas lease for failing to drill additional unit
wells while denying motion as to additional claims based on an
implied duty to market gas.

Plaintiff landowners, Robert W. Diehl, Jr., and Melanie L. Diehl,
executed an oil and gas lease in 2007 on 160.94 acres in Susquehanna
County. Before the end of the extended primary term in 2017, lesseeassignee SWN Production Company, LLC (“SWN”) unitized the lease into
two units, each with one unconventional gas well producing from the
Marcellus Shale formation.105
The Diehls filed a claim against SWN in federal court based on diversity
jurisdiction with multiple counts relating to alleged breaches of the implied
covenant to market and the implied covenant to develop the lease. SWN
filed a motion to dismiss all of the claims for failing to state a claim for
which relief could be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6).106
The district court first considered the first three counts related to the
implied duty to market. The district court noted that prior federal cases in
Pennsylvania had recognized this duty, although the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court had not recognized an implied duty to market. 107 In particular, prior
cases relied upon Texas cases to conclude that where the lease is silent, the
lessee has a duty to market the oil and gas reasonably, and in a proceeds
lease, a lessee has a duty to obtain the best price reasonably available. 108
The district court cited Texas law to conclude that “the duty to reasonably
market ‘is two-pronged: (1) ‘the lessee must market the production with
due diligence,’ and (2) must ‘obtain the best price reasonably possible.’” 109
105. Diehl v. SWN Prod. Co., No. 3:19-CV-1303, 2020 WL 1663342, at *1 (M.D. Pa.
Apr. 3, 2020).
106. Id.
107. Id. at *3 (citing Chambers v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., 359 F. Supp. 3d 268,
278 (M.D. Pa. 2019)).
108. Id. at *4 (citing Canfield v. Statoil USA Onshore Properties Inc., No. CV 3:16-0085,
2017 WL 1078184 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 22, 2017)).
109. Id. (quoting Flanagan v. Chesapeake Expl., LLC, No. 3:15-CV-0222-B, 2015 WL
6736648, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2015)).
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The first count of the Diehl’s complaint alleged that SWN violated the
implied covenant to market by selling gas for less than the best price
reasonably available. The district court refused to dismiss the claim, finding
that the Diehls alleged that SWN had provided insufficient information
regarding its downstream gas sales, while acknowledging that the Diehls
would eventually need to provide evidence where SWN could have
obtained a higher price.110 The second count and third count alleged that
SWN violated the implied covenant by selling the gas to an affiliate and by
incurring unreasonably high post-production costs. The district court
denied SWN’s motion to dismiss these claims as well as related declaratory
judgment and quiet title claims (Counts V and VI). 111
The fourth count alleged that SWN violated the implied covenant to
develop the lease by drilling additional wells. 112 In Jacobs v. CNG
Transmission Corp., the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recognized the
implied covenant to develop that requires a lessee to produce oil and gas
when a lease does not provide any compensation to the lessor other than
royalty from production.113 SWN argued that the implied covenant did not
apply because the leases provide payments in the absence of production,
including shut-in payments and gas storage rentals. The Diehls argued that
the covenant still applied because the only compensation currently being
paid was production royalties. The district court noted that the Jacobs
decision did not consider whether the covenant applied to a lease with
production in paying quantities. 114
In Caldwell v. Kriebel Resources Co., the Pennsylvania Superior Court
dismissed a claim that a lessee violated the implied covenant to develop by
failing to drill additional wells in the Marcellus Shale formation on a
leasehold with producing vertical wells. 115 The district court noted that the
Superior Court reached the same conclusion in a subsequent, nonprecedential decision. 116
110. Id. at *5.
111. Id. at *6-7, 16.
112. Id. at *7.
113. Jacobs v. CNG Transmission Corp., 565 Pa. 228 (2001).
114. Diehl, 2020 WL 1663342, at *9.
115. Caldwell v. Kriebel Res. Co., LLC, 72 A.3d 611, 613 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013).
116. Diehl, 2020 WL 1663342, at *11 (citing Norm's, Ltd. v. Atlas Noble, LLC, No. 1377
WDA 2014, 2015 WL 7112968 (Pa. Super. Ct. May 8, 2015) (“To the extent that Norm's is
arguing Atlas has a duty to completely develop and extract all exploitable resources on the
leased premises, there is no provision of the Lease that imposes such a duty and we will not
imply it for the above reasons.”)).
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In Seneca Resources Corp. v. S&T Bank, the Superior Court affirmed
summary judgment against an oil and gas lessor who claimed that the lessee
violated the implied covenant to develop all of the acreage covered by a
very high acreage lease. The Superior Court concluded that because the
lease did not contain a drilling commitment beyond the habendum clause
requirement of production in paying quantities, the express language of the
lease foreclosed the application of the implied covenant of development. 117
The district court concluded that the “Superior Court has consistently
concluded that an implied duty to develop was not applicable or was not
breached when the lessor was not holding the property without developing
it—where development had commenced it was the express terms of the
lease that controlled.”118 The Diehls failed to distinguish the cases or cite
contrary authority and the court further concluded that “during the
production phase of operations, absent express development terms in the
lease, the terms of the habendum clause represent the only bargain of the
parties and no implied duty to develop reasonably can be imposed upon the
lessee thereafter.”119 Because SWN produced from two producing wells,
SWN did not hold the lease without payment and the lease did not impose
any additional requirements.120
The district court further rejected the Diehls’ alternative claim that they
had sufficiently alleged that SWN was not acting in good faith. SWN could
rely on its business judgment unless the Diehls could provide additional
facts supporting a claim of fraud by SWN.121 The district court dismissed
Count IV of the Diehls’ complaint.

117. Diehl v. SWN Prod. Co., LLC, No. 3:19-CV-1303, 2020 WL 1663342, at *12 (M.D.
Pa. Apr. 3, 2020) (quoting Seneca Res. Corp. v. S & T Bank, 122 A.3d 374, 387 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2015) (“Thus, as the parties have stipulated that the drilling and operating requirements
under the Lease are satisfied, the Lease will extend for an indefinite secondary term as long
as any portion of the leased premises are being drilled or operated for the production of oil
or gas. Indeed, as noted in the above discussion regarding severability, the Lease makes no
mention of any duty or mandate to drill or operate the unoperated acreage for the production
of gas to continue the Lease as to that acreage in full force and effect. Based upon the
foregoing, we conclude that the Lease between the Appellants and Seneca forecloses a
finding of a breach of the implied covenant to develop and produce oil and gas on the
unoperated acreage.”) (internal citations omitted)).
118. Id. at *12.
119. Id.at *14.
120. Id.
121. Id. at *16 (citing Colgan v. Forest Oil Co., 194 Pa. 234, 241 (1899)).
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2. Butters v. SWN Prod. Co., LLC, No. 4:17-CV-797, 2020 WL 1503657
(M.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2020)
●

The district court denied oil and gas lessee’s motion for
summary judgment on lessor claims that leases had terminated
under habendum clauses, finding that lessors raised an issue of
fact as to lessee’s due diligence under operations clauses

Plaintiffs Gary R. Butters, Co-Trustee of the Butters Clinton County Gas
Protector Trust, David F. Butters, Terry L. Butters, and Glen E. Butters
(collectively, “Butters”) executed two oil and gas leases in 2005 that were
assigned to SWN Production Company, LLC (“SWN”), covering multiple
tracts in Tioga County, Pennsylvania. 122 The leases had five year primary
terms that could be extended for an additional five years, and lessee
extended the terms until 2015. The habendum clauses in the leases
provided in part that the leases would be extended beyond the primary term:
as long thereafter as (1) drilling operations continue with due
diligence, provided that LESSEE has commenced drilling
operations on any portion of the premises or any lands pooled or
unitized therewith, within the primary term. 123
The leases defined “operations” as follows:
Operations. Whenever used in this lease, the word “operations”
(unless specified to the contrary) shall mean operations for and
any of the following: dirt work, building of roads and locations,
drilling, testing, completing, reworking, recompleting,
deepening, plugging back, repairing, abandoning or dewatering
(meaning pumping or flowing of water and/or associated
hydrocarbons from a well) of a well in search of or in an
endeavor to obtain, increase or restore and/or market or render
marketable or more valuable production of oil or gas, and/or
production, actual or constructive, of oil or gas.124
SWN’s predecessor drilled a well lateral in 2011, but the well was not
connected to a pipeline due to a lack of availability. In 2015, SWN began
implementing a “Continuous Operations Schedule” on a wellpad on the unit
containing the leases and drilled one additional lateral, but it also was not
122. Butters v. SWN Prod. Co., LLC, No. 4:17-CV-797, 2020 WL 1503657, at *1 (M.D.
Pa. Mar. 30, 2020).
123. Id. at *2.
124. Id.
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brought into production.125 Under the Schedule, SWN allegedly performed
operations on the wells every 60 to 90 days to ensure that SWN met the
requirement of “due diligence” under the continuous operations clause.
The Butters brought an action to have the leases terminated in state court.
SWN removed the action to federal court on diversity grounds. 126 After the
district court denied SWN’s motion to dismiss, SWN later brought a motion
for summary judgment, arguing that there is no issue of material fact as to
whether SWN met its contractual obligation to continue operations with due
diligence. The district court adopted this general test for due diligence:
“[t]he diligence reasonably expected from, and ordinarily exercised by, a
person who seeks to satisfy a legal requirement or to discharge an
obligation.”127
The Butters argued SWN’s adoption of the Continuous Operations
Schedule was evidence of a lack of due diligence. Further, SWN argued
that it was sufficient evidence of due diligence. 128 The district court found
that the adoption of the Schedule was not per se evidence of due diligence
or evidence of a lack of due diligence.129 SWN also argued that its
completion of the second well demonstrated due diligence, but the district
court distinguished the cases cited by SWN as involving whether a lessee
had commenced operations on a lease prior to the end of the primary term,
rather than addressing proper due diligence in the secondary term. 130 The
district court also found that the parties disputed whether SWN had
complied with the 60 to 90 day schedule. The Butters alleged a six-month
period without operations and argued that SWN’s actions were indicative of
bad faith. The district court credited the Butter’s argument that SWN took
longer to complete the well than other operators but also credited SWN’s
argument that the unavailability of a pipeline should also bear on the
reasonableness of any delays, while not ipso facto excusing any delays. 131
The district court denied SWN’s motion for summary judgment, concluding
that SWN’s due diligence was an issue for the factfinder at trial.132
125. Id. at *3.
126. Id. at *5.
127. Id. at *8 (quoting Diligence, Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004)).
128. Id. at *9.
129. Id. at *10.
130. Id. (distinguishing Roe v. Chief Expl. & Dev. LLC, No. 4:11-CV-00579, 2013 WL
4083326 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 13, 2013), and Pemco Gas, Inc. v. Bernardi, 5 Pa. D. & C.3d 85
(Pa. Com. Pl. 1977)).
131. Id. at *11.
132. Id. at *11.
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3. Pennsylvania Game Comm'n v. Thomas E. Proctor Heirs Tr., No.
1:12-CV-1567, -- F.Supp.F.3d --, 2020 WL 1922628 (M.D. Pa. April 21,
2020)
●

On motion for reconsideration, the district court denied partial
summary judgment in favor of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, holding that genuine issue of fact existed as to
whether tax sale purchaser was agent of owner, precluding a
“title wash” of severed mineral interest held by predecessor of
defendants.

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania filed a complaint against two trusts
holding the interests of Thomas Proctor’s heirs (collectively, “Proctor
Heirs”) claiming ownership of surface and oil and gas rights under
numerous tracts in Sullivan and Bradford Counties. 133 The parties
eventually brought cross-motions for partial summary judgment. The Chief
Magistrate issued a report recommending that both motions be denied.
Both parties filed objections with the district court.
The motions specifically addressed ownership of the Josiah Haines
Warrant located in LeRoy Township, Bradford County, the Bellwether tract
for the litigation. Thomas Proctor and Jonathan A. Hill first conveyed the
tract in 1894 to the Union Tanning Company, excepting the oil, gas and
minerals. In 1903, Union Tanning Company conveyed the property to the
Central Pennsylvania Lumber Company (“CPLC”), excepting certain bark
rights on the timber and subject to prior reservations. In 1908, Calvin H.
McCauley purchased the property at a tax sale in 1907. The dispute
centered on which rights were conveyed in the tax sale deed. 134
In 1910, McCauley and his wife quitclaimed their interest in numerous
warrants, including the Josiah Haines Warrant, back to the CPLC. In 1920,
the CPLC conveyed the Warrant to the Pennsylvania Game Commission,
expressly subject to the exceptions in the 1894 and 1903 deeds. After 1980,
the Proctor Heirs leased the Warrant for oil and gas development. 135
The parties filed objections relating to four disputes that the
Magistrate Report identified as having a genuine issue of material fact
precluding summary judgment: 1) whether the Warrant was seated or
unseated (meaning developed or undeveloped) at the time of the 1907 tax
133. Pennsylvania Game Comm'n v. Thomas E. Proctor Heirs Tr., No. 1:12-CV-1567, -F.Supp.F.3d --, 2020 WL 1922628 (M.D. Pa. April 21, 2020).
134. Id.
135. Id. at *2.
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assessment; 2) whether McCauley acted as an agent for the Central
Pennsylvania Lumber Company when he purchased the Warrant in 1908; 3)
whether the terms of the 1920 deed to the Game Commission prevented the
conveyance of the oil, gas and mineral rights, and 4) whether the 1908 tax
sale met federal due process requirements. 136
The Game Commission’s ownership claim relied upon the theory that
the 1908 tax sale “title-washed” the severed minerals under the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Herder Spring Hunting Club v.
Keller.137 Title-washing in that decision only applies to “unseated,”
undeveloped land. The County land assessor designated the land as seated
or unseated based on an investigation of the property for permanent
improvements indicating that the land was seated. The Proctor Heirs
introduced evidence that bark-peeling (the bark was used by leather
tanneries) and lumbering activities took place on the warrant in 1905, 1906,
and 1907. 138 The bark was removed by cutting down the tree, striping off
the bark, and leaving the wood to rot. The district court concluded that a
reasonable juror could decide that the property should have been designated
as seated based on this activity.139
However, the district court found that the Proctor Heirs could not use
this to attack the validity of the 1908 tax deed. The Act of June 3, 1885,
which controlled the tax sales, provided that “[a]ll sales of seated or
unseated lands within this commonwealth which shall hereafter be made for
arrearages of taxes due thereon, shall be held, deemed and taken to be valid
and effective irrespective of the fact whether such lands were seated or
unseated at the time of the assessment of such taxes.” 140 The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court ruled that “[The Act of June 3, 1885] made an important
change in the law by validating sales which followed the assessment and it
furnished some protection to purchasers at tax sales by foreclosing litigation
as to whether the assessor had erred in determining whether the land was
in fact seated or unseated, a question which was often close and
technical.”141

136. Id.
137. Herder Spring Hunting Club v. Keller, 636 Pa. 344 (2016).
138. Pennsylvania Game Comm'n, 2020 WL 1922628 at *3-4.
139. Id. at *4.
140. Id. at 5 (quoting 72 P. S. § 5933).
141. Scott v. Bell, 344 Pa. 243, 245–46 (1942) (quoting Pittsburg Hunting Club v.
Snyder, 51 Pa. Super. 174, 182 (1912)) (emphasis added).
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The district court rejected a Third Circuit case cited by the Proctor
Heirs,142 noting that the case failed to cite prior Pennsylvania Supreme
Court decisions on the issue and misconstrued an exception in the statute.
Scott implies that the exception in the section only invalidated a tax sale as
seated or unseated when it conflicted with the underlying assessment as to
whether the property was seated or unseated, not the correctness of the
underlying assessment itself.143 The district court also cited the legislative
history of the Act to support the conclusion that the Act was intended to
stop challenges to the underlying assessment of land as seated or
unseated. 144 Accordingly, the Proctor Heirs could not challenge the validity
of the assessment as unseated. 145
The second dispute involved whether McCauley was an agent for the
CLPC when he purchased the Josiah Haines Warrant at the 1908 tax sale. 146
The Proctor Heirs introduced evidence that McCauley purchased over 100
properties of CPLC’s at delinquent tax sales and quitclaimed those tracts
back to CPLC. McCauley was identified as CPLC’s real estate agent in its
articles of incorporation and internal documents. McCauley also made
appearances as an attorney for CPLC in court proceedings. CPLC even
paid the taxes on the Warrant after McCauley purchased the Warrant. The
district court concluded that there was considerable evidence that
McCauley was CPLC’s agent.147
The district court found there was sufficient evidence to raise a
dispute of material fact as to whether that the interest sold at tax sale only
embraced the surface of the Warrant, based on the assessment in the name
of CPLC. The court distinguished this case from the Herder case because
in Herder neither party reported their interest to the county commissioners
subsequent to the severance of the Warrant.148
142. Northumberland City. v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 131 F.2d 562
(3d Cir. 1942).
143. Pennsylvania Game Comm'n, 2019 WL 6893205 at *6 (“Scott implies that the
exception operated to invalidate tax sales in the rare situation where land was regularly
assessed as seated or unseated but then sold at a tax sale as the opposite, failing to ‘follow’
its assessment.”).
144. Id. at *8-9 (citing LEGIS. REC., S. 110th Assy., 1st Sess., at 2089 (Pa. May 28,
1885)).
145. Id. at *9 (“Even if the Bradford County assessor was mistaken about the character of
the Josiah Haines warrant in 1907, the Proctor Trusts cannot challenge the validity of the
treasurer's sale by proffering evidence that the assessor misclassified the tract.”).
146. Id. at *10.
147. Id. at *11.
148. Id. at *12-13 (citing Herder Spring, 143 A.3d at 360).
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The district court cited the principle that a property owner who had a
duty to pay taxes, cannot acquire a better title by purchasing the property at
a tax sale for delinquent taxes, citing the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
decision in Powell v. Lanzy.149 Again distinguishing Herder, the district
court concluded that CPLC had a duty to pay taxes on the Warrant:
We acknowledge that, at several points in the Herder
Spring decision, the court uses language—albeit in dicta—which
could be read to infer that there was no duty to pay taxes on
unseated land. Nevertheless, when put in proper context, we do
not believe that such remarks were meant to contradict
longstanding legislation or state court precedent. 150
The district court concluded that CPLC had a duty to pay the taxes even
though they did not have personal liability or responsibility to pay the
taxes.151 If McCauley were CPLC’s agent, then under Powell CPLC could
only be vested with its surface estate.
On the third dispute, whether the oil and gas rights were reserved in the
1920 deed from CPLC to the Game Commission, the district court
concluded that the “subject to” clause was insufficient to reserve the oil, gas
and mineral rights, finding that this language intended to protect against
breach of warranty claims.152 Lastly, the district court denied the Proctor
Heirs’ claim that the tax sale law violated due process. The court concluded
that the process of constructive notice was constitutionally adequate despite
the use of notice by publication:
For treasurers’ sales in the 1800s and early 1900s, it was “not
reasonably ... practicable to give more adequate warning” to
unseated property owners. Notice by publication was the type of
notice required, expected, and relied upon at the time, and for
good reason. Such notice was “reasonably calculated to apprise
interested” unseated landowners of the pending tax sale and
“afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Stated
differently, notice by publication was “reasonably certain to
inform those affected.”153
149. Id. at *15 (citing Powell v. Lantzy, 173 Pa. 543 (1896).
150. Id. at *16.
151. Id. at *18.
152. Id. at *18.
153. Id. at *20 (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315,
317 (1950)).
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The district court found genuine issues of material fact precluding partial
summary judgment as to 1) the scope of the interest conveyed in the 1908
tax sale, and 2) whether McCauley acted as CPLC’s agent at the time of the
tax sale.154
G. Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board
1. B&R Res., LLC v. Dep’t of Envtl. Protection, EHB Docket No. 2015095-B, 2020 WL 853729 (Pa.Env.Hrg.Bd. Feb. 14, 2020), appeal
pending, 291 CD 2020 (PA. Commw. Ct.)
●

Enforcement against individual under participation theory
extends only to those violations the company could have
addressed.

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Environmental Hearing Board
applied the participation theory to find individual liability on a plugging
order issued by the Department of Environmental Protection. 155 Under its
previous adjudication in 2017, the Board found Richard Campola, the sole
member of B&R Resources, LLC, personally liable on all forty-seven wells
subject to the plugging order (the “Wells”). 156 The Board held Mr. Campola
liable under a participation theory of personal liability.157 After an appeal to
the Commonwealth Court and subsequent remand, the Board concluded
that Mr. Campola was personally liable for four of the Wells because the
company only had the resources to address four of the forty-seven
violations.
Generally, the liabilities of a business entity, like B&R Resources, do not
extend to the individual corporate officers, directors or shareholders of the
corporation, such as Mr. Campola. 158 The participation theory is an
exception to that general rule. Under the participation theory, an officer,
director or shareholder can be held individually liable for personally
participating in the wrongful conduct. 159 Here, B&R Resources owned and
operated the Wells. The Department issued an order to both B&R
154. Id.
155. B&R Resources, LLC v. Dep’t of Envtl. Protection, EHB Docket No. 2015-095-B,
2020 WL 853729 (Pa.Env.Hrg.Bd. Feb. 14, 2020), appeal pending, 291 CD 2020 (PA.
Commw. Ct.).
156. B&R Resources, LLC v. Dep’t of Envtl. Protection, EHB Docket No. 2015-095-B,
2017 WL 3585535 (Pa.Env.Hrg.Bd. Aug. 9, 2017) (“2017 Adjudication”).
157. Id. at *14.
158. Wicks v. Milzoco Builders, Inc., 503 Pa. 614, 470 A.2d 86, 90 (1983).
159. Id.
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Resources and Mr. Campola. The Department argued that Mr. Campola
was individually liable because he personally participated in the
abandonment of the Wells by failing to address the violations.
Mr. Campola appealed the 2017 adjudication and the Commonwealth
Court reversed and remanded the issue back to the Board. 160 The
Commonwealth Court concluded that personal liability could only extend to
the violations that the company could have addressed. 161 As such, the
Commonwealth Court remanded back to the Board to determine “how
many, if any, of the Wells could have been plugged if Campola had caused
B&R to make reasonable efforts to plug the Wells[.]” 162
On remand, the Board analyzed B&R Resources’ financial records and
heard expert opinion testimony submitted by both parties. The Board
concluded that B&R Resources could have used approximately $85,278 to
address the violations noted in the plugging order. 163 The Board then
divided that number by $18,500, to calculate the average cost to plug one of
the forty-seven Wells.164 After conducting its analysis, the Board found Mr.
Campola personally liable on the plugging obligations for four of the fortyseven Wells.165 The Board’s application demonstrates that it must
determine whether the company responsible for compliance can address the
violations before finding personal liability of the company’s officers,
directors or shareholders.
H. Regulatory Changes
Pennsylvania Regulatory Agency Increases Unconventional Well
Permitting Fees 150%
The fees necessary to obtain an unconventional well permit increased on
August 1, 2020.166 The Independent Regulatory Review Commission
(“IRRC”) approved a final rulemaking that increased the unconventional
well permit fee from $5,000 for non-vertical unconventional wells and
$4,200 for vertical unconventional wells to $12,500 for all unconventional
wells after the Environmental Quality Board approved the rulemaking
package on January 21, 2020. Conventional well permitting fees did not

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

B&R Res., LLC v. Dep’t of Envtl. Protection, 180 A.3d 812 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2018).
Id. at 821.
Id.
B&R Res., LLC, 2020 WL 853729, at *8.
Id.
Id.
50 Pa. Bull. 3854 (Aug. 1, 2020).
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change under the rulemaking. The fee increases became effective upon
publication in the Pennsylvania Bulletin on August 1, 2020.167

167. Id.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020

